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Abstract The procurement of public construction pro-
jects must walk a ﬁne line between the corruption of state
ofﬁcials and collusion of contractors. The method of
awarding projects to the lowest responsible tenderer was
originally implemented to guard against corruption of state
ofﬁcials. However, an investigation of the construction
industry in the Canadian province of Quebec showed that
lowest-tender-offer procurement gave rise to collusion of
companies tendering for the contracts. Alternatively, best-
value procurement has been used for decades, but here
problems arise owing to the necessity of subjective judging
of measures other than price to compare bids, giving rise to
time- and money-consuming protests. The paper proposes
a compelling argument that the construction engineering
management (CEM) culture should refocus its efforts on
enhancing project cost certainty rather than merely
searching for means to design a project in a manner that
produces the lowest initial cost, and awards the construc-
tion to the lowest tender offer that focuses on cost savings
during the project development and delivery process. The
difference in the two approaches is subtle but extremely
important. To make the transition, the engineering
management tools must be advanced to the next level.
This means that all project control tools for managing cost,
schedule, and technical scope must be transformed from
working in the deterministic mode to the stochastic mode,
thus making the probability of completing the project
within or below its ofﬁcial budget the primary decision
criterion. To do so, CEMsmust accept that there is a beneﬁt
in paying more for an alternative that increases cost
certainty for the entire project. The authors of this paper
hope that it will provide the grist for a more general dialog
across all industry sectors where engineering management
is practiced.
Keywords cost certainty, lowest responsible bid, best
value, public procurement, construction engineering man-
agement culture
1 Introduction
In 2011, Quebec’s Justice, France Charbonneau, and
Auditor General, Renaud Lachance, were commissioned to
investigate allegations of corruption in the Canadian
province’s construction industry. The allegations impli-
cated politicians, public works ofﬁcials, labor unions,
industry design professionals, construction contractors,
and organized crime syndicates (CBC News, 2015).
Transportation projects awarded and administered by the
Ministry of Transportation Quebec were the commission’s
focus. With the Charbonneau Commission named, the
investigation continued for over four years, heard
testimony from nearly 300 witnesses, and produced a
1700-page report containing 60 recommendations for the
Quebec provincial government to protect whistleblowers,
reform political contribution rules, and revise public works
procurement law (Girard, 2016). The commission’s report
contains the following ﬁnding, which encapsulates the
motivation for writing this article: “The Commission noted
that in order to win a bid [tender], a bidder will reduce his
proﬁt margin to increase its chance of winning the bid.
However, the Commission noted that the pressure created
by such a system (lowest bid [tender offer] wins) incites
contractors to devise schemes to recover their discounted
proﬁts, for example, claiming for extras [contract change
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orders], whether justiﬁed or not, reducing the quality of
work carried out, or bribing the project supervisor on the
worksite. In the longer terms, bidders may be tempted to
develop a whole system of collusion, designed initially to
minimize their losses and then, in the longer term, to
guarantee stable and sometimes highly lucrative proﬁt
margins.” (Charbonneau and Lachance, 2015).
The upshot is that the Commission asserted that the price
tension in a lowest-tender-offer award system actually
facilitated corruption in the design, construction, and
engineering management industries instead of shielding
against it. It is easy to rationalize the above ﬁnding as
merely applicable to the Province of Quebec, but to do so is
to ignore the more universal public procurement context in
which the corruption occurred and which the commis-
sioners found to be contributing factors to both the breadth
and depth of the wrongdoing (Curry, 2016). The following
four aspects covered in the report apply to all public works
procurement systems regardless of nationality (Girard,
2016):
(1) Slavish devotion to lowest-tender-offer award for all
construction projects;
(2) Policies focused on cost savings alone;
(3) Loss of internal public agency expertise that leads to
increased outsourcing of traditional agency oversight tasks
and degrades the ability to determine the reasonableness of
project costs;
(4) Creating an environment that makes collusion easy.
Hence, the remainder of this paper will place the above
four global implications of the Charbonneau report
ﬁndings for the construction engineering management
(CEM) industry in the context of contemporary project
delivery methods using relational rather than transactional
contracts. The paper’s objective is to initiate a dialog on the
following question for construction engineering managers
across the globe: Should the long-term objective of current
construction project development and delivery procure-
ment strategy be minimizing project cost or maximizing
project cost certainty?
In order to reach this objective, a brief historic overview
will be given regarding tender award procedures. In
particular, the low tender offer (LTO) and the best value
procurement (BV) will be brieﬂy highlighted. The paper
will then describe project cost certainty and how this
principle compares to lowest initial cost. A case study will
be used to further illustrate this. Then, the conclusions will
be given in the ﬁnal section.
2 Tender award procedures
“About 150 years ago, our forefathers bestowed the
competitive bidding concept on us in order to curb
corruption, inefﬁciency, and mismanagement by govern-
ment ofﬁcials” (Harp, 1991). At this writing, the reader can
add another 15 years to Harp’s 150 years, and the
transportation sector still awards the majority of its projects
to the “lowest responsive and responsible tender offer”
(Tran et al., 2016). Most statutory deﬁnitions for
competitive bidding procurement systems revolve around
the following deﬁnition:
Low Tender Offer Award Procurement––A procure-
ment process where the contract is awarded to the
lowest responsive and/or esponsible tender offeror.
(Tran et al., 2016).
The terms responsive and responsible speak to the
apparent low tender offer being technically correct per the
instructions to tenderers (signed, dated, unambiguous, etc.)
and the apparent low tenderer demonstrating that it is
competent to perform the work in accordance with the
contract terms such as the ability to furnish the requisite
bonds and possessing the necessary personnel and
equipment (Kraft et al., 2014). In most cases, the LTO
process is linear, starting with the client completing a
project’s detailed design using either in-house or con-
sultant design resources and marrying the design drawings
with its standard speciﬁcations to form the contract
construction documents. These are then combined with
agency general and special provisions and subsequently
advertised using what is commonly called an invitation for
tender offers. Sealed offers are received and publically
opened at a speciﬁed date and time. The apparent low offer
is determined based on a check for responsiveness. Shortly
thereafter, the contractor with the lowest responsive tender
offer submits the required documentation and is awarded
the contract. If a losing competitor believes that some
irregularity in the procurement is present, it has the right to
ﬁle a protest of award, but according to Yu and Wang
(2012), in a “price dominated” LTO procurement system, a
successful protest is difﬁcult since the award metric, lowest
price, is purely objective.
One advantage of LTO procurement is that it seems to
make it easy to demonstrate value for money (VfM) to the
nontechnical members of the client’s upper management.
The use of other award methods requires the client’s
technical staff to both educate and placate its upper
management when it recommends selection of a contractor
that is not the lowest offeror (Yuan et al., 2009). However,
in agreement with the ﬁndings Charbonneau and Lachance
(2015), Scott et al. (2006) stated that the award of a
contract to a supplier based on lowest tender price alone
could be false economy if there is a subsequent default, late
deliveries, or other unsatisfactory performance resulting in
additional contractual or administrative costs.
“Price is important, but it has become an increasing
burden on considering the other necessary product
requirements such as timeliness, durability, and quality”
(Harp, 1991). Procurement at the lowest price does not
necessarily require awarding to the lowest offer. Much
research has been conducted regarding the impact on cost,
schedule, and quality in the adversarial environment
induced by LTO awards. In most cases, researchers have
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found beneﬁts attributable to moving to some form of best
value (BV) award system for typical transportation projects
(Ellis et al., 1991; Songer et al., 1994; Crowley and
Hancher, 1995; Gransberg and Ellicott, 1997; Molenaar
and Gransberg, 2001; Higbee, 2004; Federal Highway
Administration (FHWA), 2006; Scott et al., 2006;
Blanchard, 2007; Scheepbouwer and Humphries, 2011;
West et al., 2012; Rueda-Benavides and Gransberg, 2014;
Tran et al., 2016). NCHRP Report 561 (Scott et al. 2006)
synthesized the BV concepts found in US state and federal
statutes. They developed the following deﬁnition for “best
value award” after identifying 15 different deﬁnitions in
state procurement statutes alone.
“Best Value Procurement––A procurement process
where price and other key factors are considered in the
evaluation and selection process to minimize impacts and
enhance the long-term performance and value of construc-
tion.” (Scott et al., 2006).
BV awards are made based on something other than
lowest initial cost alone. Bamberger and Stark (2008) posit
that BV selections “judge the comparative value of tender
offers” and “seek to choose the provider offering the best
combination of performance, qualiﬁcations, and price.” In
seeking enhanced value, public owners are turning more
often to selections that are not tied inﬂexibly to price. A
possibility lies in relational contracting methods such as
alliancing, where the price is set via collaboration with
preselected consultant(s) and contractors (Botha and
Scheepbouwer, 2015). The literature is rife with examples
of how this encourages innovation, minimizes life cycle
costs, accelerates schedules, and contractor performance
(Gransberg and Ellicott, 1997; Higbee, 2004; Federal
Highway Administration, 2006; Scott et al., 2006;
Blanchard, 2007; Tran et al., 2016).
At the very least, a synthesis of the previously cited
research leads to a consensus that a BV award does not
increase ultimate cost, extend construction schedules, or
degrade the ﬁnal constructed quality. One study found that,
“On average, the managers of design-build [one speciﬁc
form of BV] projects surveyed in the study estimated that
design-build project delivery reduced the overall duration
of their projects by 14 percent, reduced the total cost of the
projects by 3 percent, and maintained the same level of
quality as compared to design-bid-build project delivery”
(Federal Highway Administration, 2006). The same
conclusion was reached a decade later by Minchin and
Chini (2016) in a study of Florida Department of
Transportation (DOT) projects. They used data from
approximately 1500 LTO and 900 BV procurement
procedures and found that “all [alternative project delivery]
methods provided time savings and added quality, [thus]
cost savings was the main consideration in [the study’s]
performance evaluations.”
Yet, despite more than 25 years of mounting empirical
evidence supporting BV awards, public transportation
agencies continue to perpetuate the LTO procurement
culture as a result of both statutory mandates and political
opposition to BV awards by industry (Minchin and Chini,
2016). The use of BVawards regardless of the composition
of the rubric used to select the winner necessarily forces the
justiﬁcation of the incremental beneﬁts gained from
qualitative factors against the incremental increase in
capital costs (Van de Rijt and Santema, 2012). In BV
judging, “comparative value” becomes unavoidably sub-
jective. Therefore, using selections involving subjective
evaluations increases the burden on public sector owners to
maintain a fair and open process of selection (Bamberger
and Stark, 2008).
The salient issue then becomes one of how a public
client can incorporate elements that may be perceived as
subjective into the contract award process without
provoking award protests that may delay construction
start and consume time, funding, and personnel resources
defending the protest (Shane et al., 2006). The only
argument that truly remains for opposing BVawards is the
same as it was 165 years ago: Preventing corruption within
the agencies that make the construction project award
decisions. This was an argument that may have been
debunked by the Charbonneau Commission’s ﬁnding that
“the legislation, regulation and consistency of practices [of
the LTO process] of a number of public authorities, has
over the years, facilitated collusion strategies.”
3 Value for money by maximizing cost
certainty
As the Charbonneau ﬁndings suggest, focusing on
awarding projects to the lowest bidder and creating
procurement policies that focus on cost savings alone
can facilitate corruption. The next question is: how can a
public client demonstrate VfM in a manner that can be
effectively understood by its nontechnical masters in a
budget-constrained environment?
Again, while the BV literature clearly demonstrates its
ability to achieve a BV project’s critical success factors,
the explanations become increasingly arcane, making the
communication of VfM increasingly hazy, and worse,
more difﬁcult to convincingly justify to the politicians that
authorize the funding, the taxpayers, and the media.
Therefore, it becomes incumbent upon the client’s
technical and project management staff to ﬁnd a simple,
eloquent message that can be easily communicated and
validated by project performance measures. The US
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) did this in
2010 when it changed the longstanding “better, faster,
cheaper” cliché to “better, faster, smarter” (Mendez, 2010),
releasing US state DOTs from having to designate the
cheapest solution for a highway construction project in
order to obtain federal funding (West et al., 2012). The
FHWA also picked up a second slogan for highway
construction projects: “Get in, get out, stay out,” which
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clearly indicates a preference for the speedy completion of
highway construction in a manner that gives increased
weight to the project schedule and a design that maximizes
highway service life. Both factors are typically in conﬂict
with getting the project at the lowest possible cost (Tran
et al., 2016). However, taken on a whole-of-life basis, both
factors are in harmony with a paradigm shift in the CEM
project delivery culture to maximize cost certainty.
3.1 Preconstruction phase engineering management
Desiring to ﬁnish a construction project under budget and
ahead of schedule, while logical, in fact unintentionally
induces a bias to deliberately overestimate both cost and
time (Odeck, 2004). Moreover, the overarching objective
in public projects is never to ask for more money or more
time from the entity that provides the funding (Arditi
et al., 1985). Thus, the issue becomes one of making
planning, programming, and design decisions that promote
both cost and time certainty. In many countries, the
prevailing practice is to award preconstruction service
contracts such as environmental permitting, design,
surveying, and subsurface investigations on an LTO basis
(Bubshait et al., 1998). This merely extends the focus on
cost savings backward from construction to the project
scope deﬁnition and detailing process, thus minimizing the
effort that can be applied in the design and other processes
based on a budget constrained by competitive pricing.
Unfortunately, the LTO approach for consultant services
fails to recognize that the preconstruction period is where
the ultimate quality of the constructed product is deﬁned
(Hunter and Gransberg, 2014). As in all things related to
construction projects, the ﬁnal quality is directly related to
the quality of the effort applied to the preconstruction tasks
(Lopez del Puerto et al., 2016).
A commonly used approach for setting the preconstruc-
tion services (PCS) budget is to use a programming-level
estimate based on the probable construction cost multiplied
by a ﬁxed percentage often found in the client’s project
development policy documents (Craigie et al., 2016).
There are a number of problems with this approach. First,
the cliché “you get what you pay for” is applicable when an
inaccurate PCS cost estimate turns into a design quality
issue because the client’s PCS consultants are forced to
correlate the level of design reﬁnement with the available
PCS budget. Additionally, Crosset and Hines (2007) found
that “construction cost overruns often indicate a failure to
take into account site-speciﬁc factors in the project’s
design phase.” The preconstruction phase is where the
engineering manager oversees the technical deﬁnition of
the project’s scope and quantiﬁes the result, including the
site-speciﬁc factors that affect the ﬁnal technical design
product.
The issue of using a programming-level construction
estimate to set the PCS budget is also one of the quality of
the construction cost estimate itself. By deﬁnition, early
estimates are made during project scope deﬁnition and as
such cannot be considered as accurate (Alavi and Tavares,
2009). As project deﬁnition becomes more complete, these
estimates tend to grow as the amount of design detail
increases. They are also subject to the phenomenon called
“scope creep” (Crosset and Hines, 2007). For the purposes
of this article, scope creep is deﬁned as the gradual,
unrecognized addition of minor improvements to a
project’s scope of work, whose cumulative effect is to
cause project cost growth during design. This deﬁnition
assumes that the initial estimate is reasonably accurate.
Failing to recognize scope requirements in early construc-
tion cost estimates is not scope creep; rather, it is an
estimating error. The impact of an error of this nature is
compounded by using the erroneous number to generate
the PCS cost budget using a ﬁxed percentage. In other
words, the error causes the unintentional underfunding of
the planning and design activities necessary to fully deﬁne
the ﬁnal scope of work. According to a study of one public
agency’s program, “ﬁnal construction costs were 46%
higher than anticipated at the time of programming” (Alavi
and Tavares, 2009).
Gransberg et al. (2014) investigated the need to
accurately estimate PCS costs, and found that in most
cases PCS estimating accuracy was not considered
important. The researchers summed up the issue in the
words of one respondent:
“If 4% of the estimated construction cost is the
preconstruction budget, then overrunning it by 10% is
0.4% which is a tiny number. So why waste time
collecting, processing, and maintaining a preconstruction
database when the overall impact of improved estimates
and budgets results in a trivial savings?” (Gransberg
et al., 2014)
In other words, why care if the PCS budget is off
because the outcome is a small amount? This pragmatic
analysis ignores the facts that effectively belie the
argument. First, while preconstruction budgets are
expressed in monetary units, the actual unit of effort is
the billable hour for the client’s consultants. For example,
if a hypothetical ﬁxed-percentage PCS budget equates to
20,000 hours of preconstruction planning, design, and
administration effort and is off by 10%, the impact of the
error equates to 2000 hours. Since there are 2080 working
hours in the typical year, the error equates to nearly one
person-year of additional effort. Given the typical cost for
consulting engineer time with associated labor burden and
beneﬁts, the cost savings bias will equate to something
over 100,000 USD.Worse, the consultant that performs the
preconstruction activities lacks 2000 hours of billable work
effort in its contract. Thus, failing to provide a sufﬁcient
budget for completing the project’s construction docu-
ments is going to result in the consultant needing to either
rush to complete its work or reduce the overall amount of
time spent on the checking the quality of the ﬁnal product.
While it may be argued that this is not completely true for
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PCS documents developed by in-house planning and
design assets, the impact shifts appreciably when the client
chooses to outsource a majority of the preconstruction
effort (Hunter and Gransberg, 2014). The focus on LTO
awards and policies that are oriented on saving costs are
the ﬁrst two of the Charbonneu Commission’s ﬁndings.
The impact of outsourcing PCS activities takes this paper’s
analysis forward to the Commission’s third and fourth
ﬁndings.
3.2 Internal public agency expertise
The shift of oversight responsibilities from the public client
to consultants creates potential ethical issues for the
consultant. First, consultants often provide professional
engineering services to nongovernmental clients in the
design and construction industry. Thus, the potential for an
engineering ﬁrm to have a conﬂict of interest when one
client decides to pursue a project advertised by the same
ﬁrm’s public agency client is heightened (Szeliga, 2005).
Second, many public agencies are required by local statute
to prequalify design consultants on the basis of past
experience and demonstrated technical competence (Hoke,
2012). Thus, to be competitive, a consulting ﬁrm must
make its public client happy on each and every contract.
When one of the preconstruction services is to complete a
given LTO project’s construction cost estimate, a bias is
unintentionally created to inﬂate the construction estimate
to make sure that when the tender offers are opened they do
not exceed the engineer’s estimate and reﬂect poorly on the
consultants’ professional competence, potentially dimin-
ishing their competitiveness for future work. If one extends
the insidious impact of inﬂated engineers’ construction
estimates over a period of decades, one arrives at point
where the historical database used to populate the estimate
becomes inﬂated itself, further exacerbating this issue.
Couple this with an inexperienced public engineer
administering the consultants’ contracts, and the environ-
ment in which unreasonable tender offers must be
identiﬁed becomes altered to the point where it is murky
if not virtually impossible to detect bid rigging.
The last issue involving the combination of outsourced
consulting contracts administered by inexperienced public
personnel could include blatant wrongdoing by the
consultant by joining the competing contractors in a
collusion scheme. If a given project’s “ofﬁcial” estimate is
compared with the data in a historical database, which has
been unintentionally inﬂated incrementally over a period
of years, the ability to detect collusion by an inexperienced
public ofﬁcial is greatly handicapped––A ﬁnding of the
Charbonneau Commission. The fact that the detailed
pricing information in the database is publically available
on the Internet makes it easier to “calibrate” rigged tender
offers to appear to be consistent with past tenders, making
the detection of collusion even more difﬁcult. Add a
consultant that is criminally beneﬁtting from a bid-rigging
scheme, and one literally has the perfect environment in
which to hatch nearly undetectable collusion. This is
reinforced by the LTO award metric where the members of
the scheme can easily control the outcomes of each tender
since there is no inﬂuence on the award decision other than
the lowest number that ﬁts within the budget established by
the engineer’s estimate itself. The Charbonneau commis-
sion’s recommendation to use BVawards instead of LTO is
founded on the rationale described in this paragraph.
Last, a cursory search of US criminal cases that involved
bid rigging, collusion, bribery, and corruption was
conducted to determine the current magnitude of the
problem in the US case law. The search turned up over 100
potential cases during the period 1981 to 2016. This period
was selected because it was the timeframe when US public
agencies began experimenting with BV project delivery,
starting with the federal military departments in early 1981
(Beard et al., 2001). This information is provided to
demonstrate that collusion persists to the present, and the
fact that 90% of all US public construction projects
continue to be delivered using LTO award methods
(Gransberg and Molenaar, 2008) indicates that the
environment for wrongdoing will be perpetuated. Every
case involved rigging the bids on LTO procurements.
Some cases involved only a group of contractors and, at
times, design consultants representing public agencies.
Others involved corruption by public ofﬁcials who either
solicited or accepted bribes. This leads one to infer that
many of the Charbonneau ﬁndings regarding the ease with
which bids can be rigged in a system, where not only are all
the numbers published and publicly available but where
the winning number can easily be predicted, indeed applies
to US agency procurement processes. The same inference
is probably applicable outside North America as well.
3.3 Cost certainty
Research has shown that construction project cost certainty
is enhanced when the client “invests” in the PCS phase,
solving technical problems on the drawing board rather
than pushing them out to the ﬁeld where their impact is
multiplied when they are realized by the construction
contractor (Carr and Beyor, 2005). In traditional LTO
project delivery, deﬁcient design quality leads to increased
construction cost because the client warrants the quality of
the construction documents (Hunter and Gransberg, 2014).
Design errors, omissions, and quantity inaccuracies
discovered after award of the construction contract must
be paid for by contract modiﬁcations, which usually
increase the ﬁnal cost of the project (Beemer, 2005).
Research completed by Morgen (1986) and Kirby et al.
(1988) found that design deﬁciencies were the primary
driver for construction contract changes, and that “56% of
all modiﬁcations are aimed at correcting design deﬁcien-
cies.” Another study by Burati et al. (1992) found that
changes resulting from design errors identiﬁed after the
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construction contract is awarded accounted for 79% of all
change-order costs for an average of 9.5% of the total
project cost.
Carr and Beyor (2005) reported that design fees have
lagged construction inﬂation for the past three decades.
Underfunding project design contracts results in a
conundrum where “the high-quality professional services
rightfully expected by the public will become increasingly
difﬁcult [to attain] if the erosion in fees continues unabated
into the future” (Carr and Beyor, 2005). Pricing pressure
leads engineers to a point where they must provide the
necessary level of design with diminished resources, and
this may induce a bias toward minimizing design analyses
and cross-checks to maintain project proﬁtability, which
would result in the decreased quality of construction
documents (Bubshait et al., 1998; Girard, 2016). Janacek
(2006) neatly summarizes the problem by stating, “Don’t
try to squeeze that extra quarter point from their [design]
fee. For every dollar you spend up front on design and
planning you will save 10 to 20 fold down the line.”
More recently, a 2007 study of US DOTs found that only
18% of projects over 5.0 million USD in the ﬁve-year
sample were completed within their original award
amounts (Crosset and Hines, 2007). The researchers
summarized their ﬁndings in the following manner:
“In a world of uncertainty when the ﬁrst shovel of dirt is
moved, some surprises are inevitable. The clear ability of
some DOTs to outperform others suggests that success
factors for limiting surprises or at least limiting their
impact on cost and schedule may include fostering
accountability for cost and schedule, monitoring causes
of problems to identify common culprits, creating
incentives for staff and contractors to do better, and
strengthening connections between pre-construction and
construction work phases. Keeping construction on-
schedule and on-budget enables [clients] to deliver more
projects faster. Avoiding cost overruns in construction
means doing good work in preconstruction. Each of the
strong performers emphasizes the value of good coordina-
tion between the construction and pre-construction phases
of project delivery” (Crosset and Hines, 2007).
The research ﬁndings cited above infer that cost
certainty is not only low when the project development
process starts, but that it also fails to improve before the
award of the construction contract owing to client failure to
properly invest in the preconstruction budget. The previous
comment from a typical client regarding the value of
accurate PCS estimates indicated that only “trivial savings”
are possible, and demonstrates that the project develop-
ment process is inherently focused on cost savings. If true,
the apparent impact is an institutional bias to minimize
project cost, i.e., deliver as cheaply as possible. Combining
the ﬁnding of Crosset and Hines (2007) that 82% of
projects over 5.0 million USD overrun their budgets with
the collective ﬁndings cited above that design deﬁciencies
generate the majority of post-award construction cost
growth leads to the inevitable conclusion that focusing on
cost savings during preconstruction has not been success-
ful and may even exacerbate the cost growth by
unintentionally capping the resources available to produce
construction documents that are free of defects. Therefore,
a paradigm shift in the CEM culture is in order to replace
the overarching preconstruction decision criterion from
“minimize cost” to “maximize cost certainty.” This paper
proposes that PCS costs be viewed as an investment in the
preconstruction planning, design, and procurement pro-
cess. If the preconstruction process is adequately funded,
the return on that investment can be measured in terms of
enhanced cost certainty through the production of high-
quality construction and tender documents.
A simple example can be found in highway pavement
projects. The use of asphalt pavement is normally
considered to cost less than Portland cement concrete
pavement. However, the price of liquid asphalt is
considerably more volatile than that of Portland cement
(Tighe, 2001). Thus, deciding to use concrete pavement for
a road that is starting its project development process and
will take several years to reach the point where the tender
can be advertised can be seen as increasing the certainty
that the construction materials will be available at or below
the pricing assumed in the initial programming-level cost
estimate. A recent study of alternative pavement bidding in
the US actually tested this concept (Gransberg et al., 2017).
When both pavement types were competed head-to-head
with no life cycle cost adjustment, the prices for both
pavement types decreased owing to the increased competi-
tion and concrete won 67% of the time. Thus, the lesson
learned in this example is that by spending an additional
incremental amount to develop the construction documents
for two rather than one pavement type, the client reduced
the material price volatility risk. In the words of one typical
client: “Bidding pavements ‘head-to-head’ allows the open
market to determine what is constructed not outdated
assumptions made during the evaluation/selection process
years before letting” (Lenz, 2010).
3.4 Cost certainty case study
A study funded by the Oklahoma Turnpike Authority
(Gransberg et al., 2007) found a correlation between
consultant’s design fees (expressed as a percentage of
estimated construction cost at the time the fee was
established) and construction cost growth from that early
estimate. Data was gathered on 31 projects for the period
1998 through 2003, which constituted that client’s entire
construction program for ﬁve years. All projects were
awarded on an LTO basis after advancing the design to
100%. Figure 1 shows the result for the linear regression
analysis on the population. It shows that, up to a point,
spending more on the design fee creates the ability to
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increase the certainty that the project will be completed at
or below its early estimate. This occurred at around 5% in
the Oklahoma sample. Coincidentally, the turnpike
authority’s policy was to budget 3% to 5% for precon-
struction (Oklahoma Turnpike Authority (OTA), 1999).
Figure 1 includes all projects regardless of technical
complexity. The line is the best ﬁt (R2 = 0.63). Intuitively,
a client would expect to pay more for the design of a
complex bridge project than it would for an asphalt
overlay. Thus, it is important to split the population to
validate this assumption. Figure 2 shows the results of
regressing only the bridge projects. The ﬁgure not only
conﬁrms that the assumption is correct, but also conﬁrms
the trend with regard to the beneﬁts accrued during
construction as a result of increasing the investment in the
preconstruction process. The high coefﬁcient of determi-
nation (R2 = 0.93) testiﬁes to the potential for increasing
construction cost certainty by increased the investment in
the cost of preconstruction.
3.5 Impact on the CEM culture
Given the above discussion, the shift in paradigm away
from LTO toward BV must have a pronounced impact on
the CEM culture itself. The old culture is one where both
design engineers and contractors are rewarded for deliver-
ing the cheapest possible product (Tran et al., 2016). One
only has to look at the amount of time a structural engineer
spends working to reduce the amount of reinforcing steel
in a concrete beam to see how deeply ingrained the
“cheapest is best” mentality runs. Similarly, research has
shown that construction contractors fundamentally disbe-
lieve that a project can be won by other than the lowest
price (Lopez del Puerto et al., 2008). A critical analysis of
over 100 public BV solicitations (Gransberg and Barton,
2007) found that nearly 90% still used an award metric that
gave more than 50% of the weight to the lowest price,
which led the authors to conclude that “even when the
owner desires to include factors other than low price, they
defeat their efforts by applying heavy weighting to price
essentially turning the procurement into one where only
the low bidder can win.” Therefore, the real challenge to
the CEM culture is one of rooting out the inherent bias that
believes that value can only be measured in ﬁnancial terms,
and replacing it with one that truly recognizes that VfM
can be realized in non-monetary terms such as increasing
cost and schedule certainty or enhancing quality to
increase the certainty of actual project service lives.
4 Conclusions and recommendations
After describing the LTO and BVaward procedures, it was
found that these still use the lowest cost metric, albeit in a
disguised form. In BV, the attributes are still weighed
against cost, and there is still the burden of proving that the
client’s ﬁnal cost will be lower (ultimately). The authors of
this paper believe that the output of the above-described
analysis makes a compelling argument that CEM culture
should refocus its efforts on enhancing project cost
certainty rather than merely searching for means to accrue
cost savings. The difference in the two approaches is subtle
but extremely important. To make the transition, engineer-
ing management tools must be advanced to the next level.
This means that all project control tools for managing cost,
schedule, and technical scope must be transformed from
working in deterministic mode to the stochastic mode, thus
making the probability of completing the project at or
below its ofﬁcial budget the primary decision criterion. To
do so, CEMs must accept that there is a beneﬁt in paying
more for an alternative that increases the cost certainty for
the entire project.
The authors of this paper hope that it will provide the
grist for a more general dialog across all industry sectors
where engineering management is practiced. Obviously,
the details described above are only applicable to CEM in
Fig. 1 Cost growth from initial estimate vs. design fee of total
OTA population. Reprinted from (Gransberg et al., 2007) with
permission from ASCE. The arrow shows the point where the
initial estimate is reduced during preconstruction
Fig. 2 Cost growth from initial estimate vs. design fee of bridge
projects from OTA population . Reprinted from (Gransberg et al.,
2007) with permission from ASCE. The arrow shows the point
where the initial estimate is reduced during preconstruction of
bridge projects
Eric SCHEEPBOUWER et al. Is the lowest tender offer dead? 55
the transportation sector in North America. However, the
paper’s fundamental theoretical construct is valid across all
sectors. Moving from managing technical projects deter-
ministically to minimize their costs, to managing the same
projects stochastically, will have different levels of beneﬁt
in different market sectors. The philosophy of holding
engineering managers accountable for ﬁnishing projects of
all types according to the prework plan, budget, and
schedule by measuring performance in terms of outcomes
applies to all sectors. Now, hopefully, the dialog will begin.
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